Practitioners and academics alike have long studied mergers and acquisitions. One area of fruitful research has focused on the choice between cash and stock as the method of payment and the wealth effects associated with that choice. The main finding from this research is that bidders making cash offers have larger abnormal returns than those making stock offers.
1 This result prompted further investigation as to whether firm characteristics influence the choice between these two payment methods. 2 However, proxy statements document the existence of more than just one type of stock offer. The most common type of stock offer, referred to as a fixed stock offer, is characterized by the bidder offering a fixed number of its shares for each target share, say 2:1. 3 Another type, a floating stock offer, allows the number of shares exchanged to float until right before the merger's closing. The exchange ratio is then determined as either a fixed dollar amount divided by the bidder's price or the target's price divided by the bidder's price. A third type, referred to as a fixed collar offer, sets an upper and lower bound around the fixed exchange ratio within which the merger may be realized. The fourth type, floating collar offer, has a floating exchange ratio that is set right before the merger's closing if the bidder's price is between some prespecified range. For either type of collar offer, if the bidder's stock price moves outside the range, one of the merging firms has the option to cancel the merger. These additional classifications for stock offers introduce some unanswered questions regarding the method-of-payment choice in mergers:
• What are the associated wealth effects from collar offers and floating stock offers?
• Does the option to cancel the merger add "value" to the target and/or the bidder?
• Why do some firms choose collar offers?
Herein lies the motivation for my work. Previous work has focused almost exclusively on the 1 See, for example, Travlos (1987) and Brown and Ryngaert (1991) .
2 Martin (1996) finds that stock offers are more likely to be used than cash if there exists high bidder and target uncertainty and if target insiders have large ownership stakes. In a similar study, Jennings and Smith (1997) , find that tax consequences have an impact on the method-of-payment choice.
fixed stock versus cash method-of-payment comparison, but in this paper I examine the wealth effects for both target and bidder shareholders in mergers using cash, fixed stock, floating stock, fixed collar or floating collar offers. This extended empirical analysis is the main contribution of the paper. Including these additional categories in the set of contracting methods presents clearer indications of who gains and who loses. Further, studying wealth effects may provide a rationale for why some firms choose collar offers. Using a sample of 632 announced mergers between 1992 and 1997, the abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns for bidders and targets across the various offer types are compared. Then, for both targets and bidders cross-sectional regressions are run to determine if the offer types are a significant determinant of cumulative abnormal returns when controlling for other firm characteristics that impact returns (e.g., size, management resistance, etc.). Finally, since collar offers are associated with an option to cancel the merger, the collar option value is calculated and included in cross-sectional regressions to control for the potential transfer of wealth between the bidder and target.
Results indicate that targets receiving floating collar offers have announcement day abnormal returns significantly larger than those receiving cash, fixed stock or floating stock offers. Bidders have significantly positive announcement day abnormal returns when they make floating stock offers but have significantly negative returns for fixed collar, floating collar, and fixed stock offers. Further, target returns have a significant and positive relation to the collar option value, but bidder returns have no relation to the collar value. Finally, once controlling for other factors that influence returns, only fixed stock offers are associated with significant, negative abnormal returns to the bidders. Yet, targets have significant, positive abnormal returns for all offer types; highest for floating collar offers.
These results indicate a puzzle: If collar offers elicit negative abnormal returns for bidders, why do bidders use them? This question is investigated using a multinomial logit analysis that examines which target and bidder characteristics make collar offers more likely. Results indicate that collar offers are more likely if the relative size of the merger is small, if the target or bidder pre-merger inside ownership is high, and if the bidder uncertainty is low.
This paper is most closely related to Houston and Ryngaert (1997) in which the role of offer types in bank mergers helps solve the information asymmetry problem. Bank mergers are used for two reason:
1) the regulation of bank mergers generally adds time to the merger process, making uncertainty about the bidder more important, and 2) most banks make stock offers for regulatory reasons (e.g., capital requirements, etc.). The extended time from announcement to completion will allow for target and bidder uncertainty to be resolved prior to the closing. Since, conditional stock offers (defined by Houston and Ryngaert to include fixed collar, floating collar and floating stock offers) provide protection to the target for fluctuations in the bidder's value, these offers are able to mitigate the information asymmetry.
This paper focuses on why non-regulated mergers would utilize collar or floating stock offers.
These mergers generally have less time from announcement to completion, thus requiring less price protection. Consistent with this idea, results indicate that if bidder uncertainty is high, bidders are less likely to use collar or floating stock offers and more likely to make fixed stock offers. However, for nonregulated mergers, bidder and target pre-merger insider ownership motivates the use of collar offers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the existing literature for possible reasons why collar offers exist. Section III details the characteristics of collar offers. Section IV describes the sample and the collar simulation. Section V examines the wealth effects, and Section VI discusses the cross-sectional regressions. Section VII presents the multinomial logit analysis used to determine bidder characteristics of the different stock offer types. Section VIII concludes.
II. Theoretical Considerations
The extant literature that explains or documents the different types of stock merger contracts is sparse. Gaughan (1991) offers a brief description of collar offers and asserts (based on anecdotal observations) that a bidder with high price variance is more likely to make a collar offer, as is a bidder in a different industry than the target. Since stock mergers tend to take longer from announcement to completion than cash mergers, there is a greater chance the value of the target's and bidder's shares may change dramatically. Collar offers would allow for some price movement but protect both firms from large price variations. Further, if the two firms are in the same industry, market movements that affect both stock prices would most likely be in the same direction, indicating little need for the collar offers protection. Gaughan also hypothesizes that collar offers may simply indicate a renegotiation point.
As Myers and Majluf (1984) suggested, a bidder will use stock as the medium of exchange if it believes its shares are overvalued. Since target shareholders know this, they will not accept a stock offer.
Berkovitch and Narayanan (1990 ), Fishman (1989 , and Eckbo, Giammarino and Heinkel (1990) expand on this idea and show that higher-valued bidders will use cash or a higher proportion of cash to signal their value to the market. However, if the bidder is uncertain about the target's value, the bidder may not want to offer cash. Since a target only accepts a cash offer greater than their true value, the bidder will have overpaid. Hansen (1987) solves this dilemma by suggesting that bidders make stock offers. Since stock offers have a "contingency pricing effect", the target is forced to share part of the risk that the bidder may have overpaid when evaluating a stock offer. Thus, the literature suggest that bidders make cash offers when there exist high uncertainty regarding their value and make stock offers when there exists high uncertainty regarding the target's value.
Since a collar offer provides the target a range within which the bidder estimates its value, it reduces the uncertainty regarding the bidder's value and thus reduces the adverse selection costs about the bidder, yet retains Hansen's benefit of a stock offer. Further, because a collar offer is composed entirely of stock, it is classified as a nontaxable merger and has certain tax benefits as discussed in Crawford (1987). 4 He suggests there are two benefits to a nontaxable merger. First, the target shareholders pay no capital gains tax until they sell the shares. Second, nontaxable mergers allow any net operating losses or investment tax credit carryovers of the target to be realized by the bidder. 5 Therefore, employing the 4 A merger is nontaxable if the target is acquired by at least a fifty percent stock exchange.
above reasoning, collar offers may capture the benefits of stock offers with respect to tax benefits and target uncertainty and capture the benefits of being like a cash offer with respect to bidder uncertainty.
III. Collar Offers

A. Description
Similar to stock offers, there are both fixed and floating collar offers. A fixed collar offer fixes the exchange ratio and includes a price range within which the bidder's price must remain for the merger to proceed to shareholder vote. If the price moves outside the range, either the target or the bidder has the option to cancel or renegotiate the deal. The Baxter Travenol -Caremark merger is an example of a fixed collar offer. Baxter Travenol's stock price was allowed to fluctuate between $24.88 and $27.00. If the average trading price of Baxter Travenol during the 10-day trading period ending three days before closing of the merger was within $24.88 and $27.00, the exchange rate was fixed at 0.86:1.
The fixed collar offer provides very distinct protection for each party. As the bidder's (Baxter's) price increases, the bidder pays more for the target (Caremark). The upper boundary protects the bidder from giving the target more shares than if the current market values were used to determine the exchange rate, assuming no change in the target's price. Similarly, the lower price level protects the target. As the bidder's price falls, the target would give up more of its own shares than it would if current market values were used to determine the exchange rate. Therefore, once the bidder's stock price starts to fall, the target may want to void the agreement.
A floating collar offer specifies that the bidder will pay a constant dollar amount for each target share. Since the method of payment is stock, the exchange ratio floats until just before the shareholder vote in order to yield a constant dollar amount. This exchange ratio floats within a maximum and minimum level negotiated by the firms, if the exchange ratio at expiration is outside the levels set, the option to cancel exists. A general example of the floating collar offer is as follows. The bidder offers not less than one share and not more than two shares of its common stock in exchange for each share of the target's common stock (1:1 to 2:1). The exact number of shares to be exchanged is determined by dividing a constant dollar amount (the offer price) by the average closing price of the bidder for some number of trading days prior to the shareholder vote. Suppose that the constant dollar amount is $50 and the average bidder's price for 10 days prior to the shareholder vote is $40. In this case, the exchange ratio would be 1.25:1 ($50/$40), which is within the pre-specified range.
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The upper boundary of the floating collar offer, reached by a decrease in the bidder's price, protects the bidder from exchanging more shares of its stock for each target share than indicated by current market vales. Without this bound the bidding firm could potentially give up a large ownership fraction. Once again, the lower boundary protects the target from increases in the bidder's price. Since the floating collar offer guarantees a constant dollar amount for each target share, the lower boundary gives the target a minimum percentage of ownership in the merged firm. This is important if the target is concerned with not only the value of the merger but also the ownership interest. Thus, one can view collar offers as insuring the target (and bidder) against large variation in the bidder's price. If the manager has more information about the bidding firm assets, then a fixed share offer is more attractive, all else equal, to an overvalued bidder than a floating stock offer or either collar offer.
In the fixed share offer, the value of the target's claim on the combined entity decreases as the bidder's share price falls before the final consummation of the offer. In contrast, in a floating share offer the target firm's share of the combined entity is largely or completely unaffected by changes in the value of the bidder firm's assets. Collars can impact the extent to which changes in the value of the bidding firm's assets affect the target shareholder's payoffs. Both the fixed and floating collar offers make the target's payoff less sensitive to changes in the bidders valuation. In a fixed collar offer small fluctuations in the bidder's price do not change the exchange ratio; however, if the bidder's price decreases (increases) 6 It can easily be determined that the average closing price of the bidder must be between $25 to $50. 7 An alternative motivation for the lower boundary can be paralleled to interest rate collars. An interest rate collar is simply a cap, which sets an upper limit on the interest rate the borrower pays, and a floor, which sets a minimum interest rate paid, combined together. Caps alone are usually very expensive since the lender faces losses with a decline in interest rates but does not gain when interest rates increase. Therefore, the borrower sells a floor to the lender to offset part or all of the price of the cap. Similarly in a merger, the bidder may wish to lower the cost of the upper bound by promising the target a minimum number of shares. dramatically, the target (bidder) is protected. A floating collar offer also provides an insurance contract to the target for both large and small increases in the bidder's stock price. Since the exchange rate fluctuates within a certain range, small bidder price movements will readjust the exchange ratio. Further, for large bidder price movements, the target has the option to cancel. Therefore, floating collar offers protect the target from both large and small movements in the bidder's price. Thus, the four stock offers in terms of the target's sensitivity to changes in the bidder valuation would be, lowest to highest: floating collar, floating stock, fixed collar, and fixed stock.
Finally, it has been suggested that collar offers are included in merger contracts as a material adverse change (MAC) clause. Since MAC clauses are rarely invoked due to the difficulty in proving a material adverse change and the associated cost of exercising the clause, a collar offer may be a simpler and cheaper way to invoke a MAC clause.
8 However, MAC clauses exist separately from the collar offer descriptions in the proxy statements. Further, MAC clauses are with regards to adverse changes in both the bidder and target firms' value, while in a collar offer only the bidder's price is limited in terms of its fluctuations. Therefore, it seems as if collar offers exist for other reasons than to imitate a MAC clause.
B. Collar Option Valuation
The value of the option embedded in a collar offer can be estimated using option pricing. This allows one to estimate the value to the target and bidder of the insurance the collar offer provides to the deal. A collar offer can be viewed as a barrier-exchange option. There exists two types of barrier options: 1) a knock-out option is an option that ceases to exist once the underlying asset's price surpasses a pre-specified boundary, and 2) a knock-in option is an option that comes into existence once the asset's price surpasses a pre-specified boundary. An exchange option is defined as an option to exchange one asset for another. Since a merger is an agreement to exchange some amount of the bidder's stock for some amount of the target's stock, it can be viewed as an exchange option. Thus, since a collar option is an option to cancel a merger that exists only if the average bidder price surpasses the upper or lower boundary, it is a knock-in exchange option. If the exchange ratio between the merging parties is viewed as a position that both companies hold at t=0, then this is equivalent to the bidder owning one share of the target's stock in exchange for giving γ shares of its stock to the target, and vice versa. When a boundary is surpassed, the option to exchange stock back to the original owner comes into existence. By exercising the option, the merger agreement is canceled.
The floating collar offer, in a practical sense, renegotiates the exchange ratio, ( ) 
The bidder's collar option payoff has a similar form but the payoff is ( )
if either boundary is exceeded. Together the two positions net to zero in all states.
For the fixed collar offer, the exchange ratio, γ , is not dependent upon the average bidder's price, and the ranges are defined in terms of prices and not ratios. Panel A of Table 1 provides summary statistics for the sample of mergers for each method of payment. The number of offers made each year along with the proportion of mergers that were successful, were canceled, were revised (one or two times), had competition, or had target resistance are reported. Panel B reports the t-statistic for a two-tailed difference-of-means test for competition, successfulness, cancellation and revision between the various offer types. The only significant difference between the offer types is with regards to success; collar offers (both types) are significantly more likely to be successful than cash or stock offers at the 10% level.
insert Table 1 here Detailed information regarding the terms of the collar offer mergers, including exchange ratios, stockholder voting dates, price ranges, offer prices, etc., was obtained from DJNR and SDC. For each collar offer, the collar value was estimated, using equation (1) or (2). Following methodology outlined in
Hull (2000), the collar option value was determined by simulating the underlying stock prices of the target and bidder. Collar options are path dependent since the bidder's price is averaged over a prespecified time period and used to determine the exchange ratio. The Treasury bill yield with the maturity closest to the maturity of the collar offer is used as the interest rate for the stock price simulations.
Monthly Treasury bill yields are obtained from the CRSP-Fama term-structure files. The procedure outlined in Sheikh and Ronn (1994) that interpolates between monthly dates in order to estimate the daily interest rate for each collar offer is employed. Using CRSP daily returns for the trading days ten months to two months (t=-200 to t=-60) before the merger announcement, the standard deviations of the target and bidder and correlation between the target and bidder are obtained.
The variances are assumed to be the same for all days. 11 The time to expiration of the option is estimated as the actual time from announcement to the stockholder vote. In reality, the time to maturity of these collar offers is usually unknown at announcement. 12 For example, the stockholder vote may be arranged specially by the target, it might be the next regularly scheduled stockholder meeting, or it may be canceled until the board has reviewed the merger proposal. realization of the stock prices at expiration from which the collar option value at expiration given in either equation (1) or (2) is computed. This procedure is repeated 10,000 times and then averaged to obtain an estimate of the expected payoff of the collar option. Finally, the present value of the collar option payoff for both firms is calculated as
13 See Hogg and Craig (1978) for a discussion of conditional distributions. Table 2 summarizes this information for the collar offer sample. As indicated in Table 2 , most collar offers do not have symmetric ranges. The difference between the upper boundary price and the bidder's price one week before announcement is approximately 20% larger than the difference between the lower boundary price and the bidder's price. Of the 83 collar options, twelve were in-the-money at expiration. In six instances the option was in-the-money for the bidder but of these only two options were exercised. In the other four cases, the mergers went forward at the lower boundary. Targets never exercised in the three instances where their option was in-the-money. Finally, three of these in-themoney collar offers were revised when the bidder's price hit one of the boundaries prior to expiration. insert Table 2 here
V. Wealth Effects
Investigations of the wealth effects of the target and bidder in mergers utilizing collar offers, stock, and cash are employed using a market model event study methodology as outlined in Travlos estimates of the market -model parameter. This procedure is followed for an 11-day period, ( τ =-5 to τ =5) to determine the average daily AR and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs).
14 Since Fama and French (1992) find that ß does not seem to explain the cross-section of average returns, but that size and book-tomarket value do provide a "powerful characterization of the cross-section of average stock returns," a comparison of the size and book-tomarket values of the bidders and targets in the sample is done. After replicating their methodology, the results for the difference of means tests on the announcement day abnormal returns are similar to that of the market model methodology. Results are available from the author upon request.
The two-day ( τ =-1,0) average abnormal return for both targets and bidders for each offer category are reported in insert Table 3 here Table 3 indicates that bidders who make floating stock offers have ARs significantly higher than all other offer types, including cash. This may be that bidders are signaling that they are undervalued using a floating stock offer. Greenbaum and Thakor (1995) propose that floating stock offers act as a signal of the bidder's value. Given the intense scrutiny that follows mergers, there is more likelihood that the bidder's true value will be revealed and thus, target shareholders will receive a fair value for their shares if the offer is a floating stock offer. Further, though the bidder returns for fixed and floating collar offers are not significantly different than cash or fixed stock offers, they are sandwiched in between bidder returns for fixed stock offers. It could be that the market views the insurance provided by the collar offers as valuable but the use of 100% stock still signals an overvaluation relative to a cash or floating stock offer.
Interestingly, as can be seen in Figure 1 , the 11-day CARs ( τ =-5, τ =5) of targets indicate that floating collar offers and cash offers have returns that are almost identical, while floating stock offers are much lower. Bidders making floating stock offers have CARs much higher than all other offer types.
However, fixed stock offers seem to be the worst decision, in terms of wealth effects, for bidders. Collar offer seem to have CARs in between floating and fixed stock offers.
insert Figure 1 here
VI. Cross-Sectional Regressions
The univariate results reported do not control for numerous factors that conceivably contribute to ARs. In this section multivariate tests are conducted that seek to control for the relative size of the merger, the existence of competition for the target, management resistance, and success of a merger.
Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins (1983) found the relative size of the merger to be a significant determinant of CARs over a twenty-day period, while Niden (1990) finds that the existence of competition for the target has a significant impact on CARs. Target management res istance is included since Jennings and Mazzeo (1993) suggest that management resistance can increase target shareholder wealth. Finally, Travlos (1987) finds that the proportion of cash used for payment was a significant determinant of the CAR as was the successfulness of the takeover attempt. However, instead of including the proportion of cash as in Travlos (1987) , indicator variables for each offer type are used to account for the four different stock offer types since these merger are either 100% stock or 100% cash. These indicator variables measure the impact of the differing types of contracts on CARs for both the target and bidder. 15 The following regression is estimated using weighted least squares with the weight as the reciprocal of each firm's forecast variance.
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15 See Appendix A for a list of the variables used in the multivariate regressions and multinomial logit. 16 All multivariate regressions use weighted least squares with the reciprocal of the firm's forecast variance as the weight.
where SIZE is the log of the relative market values of the target and bidder firms one month prior to the announcement, SUCCESS, COMPETITION, and RESIST are all indicator variables for if the merger was successful, if there was competition, and if there was resistance, respectively, FXS, FXC, FLS, and FLC are indicator variables for a fixed stock offer, fixed collar offer, floating stock offer, and floating collar offer, respectively, and ε is the error. insert Table 4 here For the target, FLC is significantly positive while FXC is insignificant. This indicates that the market views the floating collar offers as having significant value for the target. This is due to the fact that the floating collar offers allow the exchange ratio to fluctuate while still providing price protection. In the full regression (Model 2), FLC remains significantly positive, indicating that floating collar offers do significantly better than cash at the 10% level. Fixed collar offers are insignificantly different from cash offers, while fixed and floating stock offers do significantly worse cash offers. SUCCESS is significantly positive at the 10% level, while SIZE is significantly negative at the 1% level. COMPETITION and RESIST are both insignificant. A joint test of whether the four stock dummy variables are significantly different than one another is significant at the 5% level.
The bidder experiences a negative but insignificant response to making either floating collar offers or fixed collar offers. In the full regression (Model 2), the only significant coefficient is for FXS.
The four stock dummy variables are jointly significantly different than one another at the 5% level, but Next, the CARs are regressed on the simulated collar option value normalized by the target's or bidder's price one week prior to the announcement (COLLAR). This will allow for the variability in the bidder's and target's value to be represented, as well as the cancellation option. If the market values this option, the coefficient on the option value should be positive. The simulated collar option value is used instead of the width of the range to account the differences in bidders' variances and time to maturity, thus standardizing the ranges. 17 Regressions have been done where the fixed stock offers are represented by one dummy variable and all floating stock and fixed and floating collar offers are represented by another dummy variable. Results were qualitatively similar and are available upon request. 18 To determine the overall effects of the merger, a portfolio of the returns is formed by using the value-weighted average of both firms' abnormal returns, and equation (7) is re-estimated. Since the results are qualitative the same as those reported in Table 4 , they are available upon request. This is not surprising since bidders are usually larger than targets, so more weight is given to the bidders' returns.
Regressing the CARs on the option value alone shows that the option value is positive and significant at the 5% level for the target and insignificant for the bidder. This indicates that the market views the option as a valuable asset for the target but not so for the bidder. In the full regression (Model 4) for the target, results remain the same for all variables as in Model 2 and COLLAR is significant at the 5% level. Nevertheless, given the descriptive statistics in Table 2 , the target never exercises its option to cancel the merger, though the market values the option highly in the two-day CARs. For the bidder, the option value is negative but insignificant when combined with the other explanatory variables. All variables remain at the previous significance levels. Interestingly, this implies that the market views the value of the bidder's option to cancel as negligible, though in the sample some bidders did exercise their option to cancel the merger.
VII. Multinomial Logit and Results
Since the previous sections find that floating and collar offers yield higher bidder returns than fixed stock offers, a question arises as to why all bidders who make stock offers do not use one of these methods. It may be the bidder is overvalued or the cost associated with providing the target the cancellation option is too expensive. This section investigates the bidder characteristics that make the various stock offers more probable. Jennings and Smith (1997) and Martin (1996) have shown that the choice between cash or stock as the method of payment is based on tax consequences, leverage amounts, informational asymmetries, and overall market conditions. However, the choice between the various stock methods should not be dependent upon tax consequences or leverage amounts. Instead, the choice should be related to informational asymmetries, variation in the bidder's assets, and relative size of the merger.
The multinomial logit procedure estimates the probability that the bidder will choose method-ofpayment j , where j = 0 for fixed stock offers, = 1 for floating stock offers, = 2 for fixed collar offers, and = 3 for floating collar offers. These probabilities are given by 
Note that X i is the vector of observed attributes that vary with the decision of making a stock offer (e.g., bidder price variance). That is,
SIC is a dummy variable that equals one if the bidder and target have the same first three digits of their SIC codes and 0 otherwise. This will capture Gaughan's (1991) hypothesis that collars are offered when the bidder and target are in different industries and, thus, greater informational asymmetries exist.
BRETVAR is the variation in the bidder's return measured as the variance in returns reported on CRSP for six months prior to the announcement. 19 This captures Gaughan's hypothesis that bidders with greater variation in their asset values are be more likely to make collar offers. TMKTBK and BMKTBK measure the bidder's and target's value uncertainty, respectively, prior to the merger announcement. The proxy for value uncertainty is the market-to-book ratio for the year prior to the merger. Since the market-tobook is a proxy for growth opportunities of the firm and Chung and Charoenwong(1991) find that higher growth opportunities are associated with high riskiness of common stock, firms with higher market-tobook ratios are assumed to have higher uncertainty. Martin (1996) also argues that the more growth potential for a firm, the more uncertainty about that firm's value. RELSIZE is the relative size of the merger. The larger the target relative to the bidder, the greater the target's sensitivity to the variability of the bidder's price. Thus, the larger the relative size, the less likely a bidder should be to make a fixed stock offer. YEAR is included to account for the fact that after 1994 the S&P 500 had returns greater than 20% each year, while from 1992 to 1994 returns were less than 11%. 20 Thus, there may be some time trend that could impact method-of-payment. Finally, TOWN and BOWN are the insider ownership percentages of the target and the bidder, respectively, gathered from the proxy statements on the Edgar website. As ownership may play an important role in the post-merger entity, then stock offers that will guarantee some minimum ownership for the target and not "too" much ownership to the target will be more likely. Since collar offers (both fixed and floating) keep the ownership in the post-merged company more stable, then collar offers may be more likely when the target and/or the bidder have large inside ownership pre-merger.
The results of the multinomial logit analysis are reported in Table 5 . Model 1 presents the results using the market-to-book ratio is used as the proxy for uncertainty. Model 2 also uses the market-to-book ratio as a proxy for uncertainty. Following Martin's (1996) methodology, if the firm's market-to-book ratio is greater than one, the firm is classified as having high growth potential, and if it is less than one, it has low growth potential. Indicator variables for each target-bidder pair are constructed as follows. If both target and bidder have high (low) growth opportunities, then the indicator variable, HH (LL), equals 1, otherwise 0. If the bidder has low (high) growth opportunities but the target has high (low) growth opportunities, then the indicator variable, LH (HL), equals 1, otherwise 0.
insert Table 5 here Table 5 indicates that for Model 1 SIC is insignificant for all offer types. Thus, when firms are in different industries, they are equally likely to choose any offer type. This is inconsistent with Gaughan's (1991) hypothesis that collar offers are used more in mergers involving firms in different industries.
BRETVAR is also insignificant for all offer types. Again, this is inconsistent with Gaughan's hypothesis that collars are used more often in mergers where there is significant past bidder price variation. YEAR is insignificant for all offer types. Hence, there does not seem to be a time trend in the data. The relative size of the merger (RELSIZE) is negative and significant for all offer types. Thus, fixed stock offers are more likely than floating stock, fixed collar, floating collar offers. This indicates that the larger the target relative to the bidder, the more likely the bidder is to make a fixed stock offer. TOWN is positive and significant both fixed and floating collar offers. This indicates that when the target has high per-merger inside ownership, the bidder is more likely to make a collar offer. However, the bidder is equally likely to make a floating stock and fixed stock offer. BOWN is also positive and significant for fixed collar and floating collar offers but insignificant for floating stock offers. The higher the bidder's pre-merger inside ownership, the more likely the bidder is to make a collar offer than fixed stock offer. Thus, the ownership protection the collar provides for the bidder and target is an important determinant for using collar offers.
In Model 1 TMKTBK is insignificant for all offer types, while BMKT BK is negative and significant for floating stock and floating collar offers but insignificant for fixed collar offers. This indicates that when there is high uncertainty regarding the bidder's the bidder is more likely to make a fixed stock offer than a floating stock or floating collar offer. This supports Myers and Majluf's (1984) hypothesis that bidders make fixed stock offers when there is greater uncertainty regarding their value (overvaluation). Unfortunately, it does not appear that bidders will use collar offers to reduce bidder uncertainty. Model 2 indicates that only when the bidder's and target's market-to-book ratios are greater than one (HH), does the likelihood of a fixed stock offer increase. This supports the asymmetric argument by Hansen (1987) that bidders use fixed stock offers when target uncertainty is high but only if bidder uncertainty is high also. If there is high bidder uncertainty and low target uncertainty (HL), then the bidder is no more likely to make a floating collar or stock offer and a fixed collar or fixed stock offer.
Again, all other variables remain maintain their same significance.
VIII. Conclusion
This paper provides a detailed description of two unique stock offers, fixed and floating collar offers. Further, the wealth effects associated with cash and all four stock offer types are investigated.
Interestingly, targets receiving floating collar offers experience significantly higher abnormal returns than those targets receiving cash or fixed or floating stock offers and experience returns similar to those targets receiving fixed collar offers. Further investigation suggests that this may be due to the associated cancellation option. The target's option to cancel the merger proves to be highly significant. However, this option does not significantly impact the bidder's abnormal returns. In fact, the simple inclusion of either a fixed or floating collar has a significantly negative effect on bidder returns. Given these results, a multinomial logit model was developed to determine if firm characteristics, such as value uncertainty, industry differences, etc., could explain the existence of collar offers. Collar offers are more likely if the relative size of the merger is small, if the target or bidder insid e ownership is high, and if the bidder uncertainty is low. This last result, that collar offers are not used to resolve bidder uncertainty may be due to the fact that the sample has non-regulated mergers only. Given the relatively short time to completion, compared to regulated mergers, collar offers do not seem to provide protection for bidder uncertainty resolution. Though, collar offers do not seem to capture the best aspects of stock and cash offers, that is, solving both target and bidder uncertainty, fixed and floating collar offers do offer ownership protection to the target and bidder insiders. This last point provides a compelling argument for using collar offers in non-regulated mergers. Further, collar offers do present an alternative method of payment that provides cancellation protection. The column of offer types states the mean that is subtracted from the mean in the row of offer types. For example, in the success comparisons, the t-statistic for the difference in the mean of cash minus the mean of fixed stock is -0.19.
*,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level Target and bidder two-day ( τ =-1,0) average abnormal returns for 632 merger announcement from 1992 to 1997. The mergers are classified by method-of-payment used in each merger: cash (217), fixed stock (242), floating stock (90), fixed collar (38), and floating collar offers (44). Comparisons of the two-day average abnormal returns report the percentage difference of the mean abnormal return for the row offer type minus the mean abnormal return for the column offer type. For example, the mean abnormal return for cash minus the mean abnormal return for fixed stock is 3.73%. Weighted least squares regression Results using data from 632 mergers from 1992-1997. The dependent variable in each regression is the two-day ( τ '-1,0) cumulative abnormal returns. In Models 1-4, the dependent variable is the targets' returns and in Models 5-8, the dependent variable is the bidders' returns. SIZE is the log of the ratio of the target's market value to the bidder's market value one month prior to the merger announcement. SUCCESS is a dummy variable for if the merger is successful merger. COMPETITION is a dummy variable for if competition existed. RESIST is a dummy variable for if managerial resistance existed. FXS, FLS, FXC, and FLS are dummy variables for fix ed stock offer, floating stock offer, fixed collar offer, and floating collar offer. COLLAR is the simulated option value normalized by the target's or bidder's price one week prior to the merger announcement. P-values are in parentheses.
Target 2-day Abnormal Returns
Panel A -Target CARs
Model 1 Multinomial logit regression results using data from merger announcements between 1992 and 1997. The dependent variable equals 0 for a fixed stock offer, 1 for a floating stock offer, 2 for a fixed collar stock offer, and 3 for a floating collar offer. SIC is an indicator variable for whether the firms are in similar industries. YEAR is an indicator variable if the merger was announced in 1992, 1993, or 1994 . BRETVAR is the bidder return variance. TMKTBK and BMKTBK are the target's and bidder's marketto-book ratio, respectively. HH, HL, and LH are indicator variables for the bidder's and target's marketto-book ratio, respectively. The indicator variable for market-to-book ratio is H if the market-to-book ratio is greater than 1. P-values in parenthesis. 
